Differentiating Church and State (Without Losing the Church) by Brennan, Patrick McKinley
Working Paper Series
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Year 2008
Differentiating Church and State
(Without Losing the Church)
Patrick McKinley Brennan
1567, brennan@law.villanova.edu
This paper is posted at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/wps/art112
 1 
Differentiating Church and State (Without Losing the Church) 
 
 
Patrick McKinley Brennan1 
 
 
I.  Introduction:  Harvesting the Lessons of Expulsion 
 
 
 When it comes to libertas Ecclesiae, “the liberty of the Church,” what is at stake 
came tumbling home to me in a flash one morning, in 2005, as I stood high in a remote 
mountain range in the south of France.  Someone once said that there is nothing like a 
gallows to focus a man’s mind:  For me there was nothing like seeing how, in 1903, 
soldiers enforcing the legislative will of the French Third Republic marched monks from 
their home in those remote mountains, from the monastery where they and their forebears 
had dwelt in silence since the year 1084.  I refer to the expulsion of the Carthusian monks 
from their motherhouse, La Grande Chartreuse, and thence from France itself.  The 
images in the pictures I saw there, in the museum just down the hill from La Grande 
Chartreuse, are almost beyond belief.  The caption could read: “Armed soldiers arrest 
contemplatives.”2    
                                                 
1
   John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law, Villanova University School of 
Law.  For research assistance on this paper, I am grateful to Erin Galbally and Lindsay Bish.  I thank my 
colleague Michael Moreland for most helpful comments on the paper, and I thank the Federalist Society’s 
Section on Religious Liberties for the invitation to prepare this paper for a conference at  the Georgetown 
Law Center. 
2
   Some of the same pictures can be found in La Grande Chartreuse Au-Dela Du Silence (Grenoble: 
Editions Glenat, 2002), 43-45.  That book also offers an excellent introduction to the life and history of the 
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 A statute passed in 1901 required that religious orders, if they wished to remain in 
France, obtain an authorization from the government, if they could:  “No religious 
congregation may be formed without an authorization given by a law which shall 
determine the conditions of its operation. . . .  Congregations existing at the time of the 
promulgation of the present law which have not been previously authorized or recognized 
must prove within the space of three months that they have taken the necessary steps to 
conform to its requirements.”3  The Carthusians of La Grande Chartreuse could not 
obtain the required authorization, but not for any lack of trying on their part.  As the New 
York Times reported on March 27, 1903: 
 
The Chamber of Deputies to-day completed the Government’s programme 
regarding the male religious orders which applied for authorization to 
remain in France.  It refused by a large majority, the application of the 
Carthusian monks.  They were separated from the other orders in the 
consideration of the applications as forming a class apart, they being 
employed in the manufacturing of a cordial. . . .   The Chamber . . ., by a 
vote of 338 to 231, refused to entertain the Carthusians’ application, and 
adjourned.4 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Carthusian monks.  A recent English language introduction to the Carthusian way is Robin Bruce Lockhart, 
Halfway to Heaven: The Hidden Life of the Carthusians 2nd. ed(Spencer, Mass.: Cistercian Publications, 
1999).  
3
   Law of Associations, III, 13, 18, reprinted in J.F. Maclear, Church and State in the Modern Age: A 
Documentary History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 294-96 
4
   On Prime Minister Emile Combes’s zealous enforcement of the 1901 statute, see John McManners, 
Church and State in France, 1870-1914 129-39 (1972). 
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Without the monks’ having enjoyed so much as a proper hearing, the soldiers were 
dispatched, the monks dispersed, and their common life of cloistered prayer terminated.  
The soldiers came at three o’clock in the morning while the community was singing the 
Divine Office in church, and they proceeded to arrest the monks one by one.5  With that, 
the unique amalgam of eremetism and cenobitism that the followers of Saint Bruno had 
pursued and refined in that remote site since 1084 thus vanished again, the first time 
being upon their expulsion during that press for liberty, equality, and fraternity called the 
Revolution.  So much for liberty for the possibility of monastic fraternity.  The Church, 
instantiated in the community of La Grande Chartreuse, was no longer at liberty to be 
herself.     
 
 Most denials of the life and liberty of the Church are, we can suppose, less 
dramatic than monks being pried out of their monasteries by armies.  But it was the 
consequences of that 1901 statute and the expulsion as I saw it memorialized at La 
Grande Chartreuse that focused for me the nature of the problem of the liberty of the 
Church.  Difficult as it may be for us Americans to recognize, religious liberty is not just 
about individuals and their solitary acts of free conscience, however sublime those might 
be.  Religion, or at least the Catholic religion, is something people do together, in 
communion and in communities – or, as I shall prefer – in societies.  That is, individuals 
                                                 
5
   Though there were a few dramatic incidents, most of the religious orders whose requests for 
authorizations were denied at the same time as the Carthusians’ dispersed quietly and quickly.  “The most 
serious incident occurred at the Grande-Chartreuse monastery.  The colonel entrusted with the task of 
expelling the monks gave the necessary orders and then handed in his own resignation.  When the day 
arrived, thousands of peasants gathered, armed with sticks.  Bonfires were lighted in the mountains and the 
tocsins rang out from the churches in reply to the great monastery bells.  Vehicles, trees, and rocks blocked 
the road.  The soldiers arrived at three o’clock in the morning and the sappers had to use axes on the doors.  
The fathers, who were singing office in the chapel, were arrested one by one while the crowd intoned the 
words of Parce Domine.”  Adrien Dansette, Religious History of Modern France (Hew York: Herder and 
Herder, 1961), vol.  II. 201-02. 
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practice the Catholic religion in part through associating with one another, and instances 
of associating take on almost every conceivable size and shape.  Examples include the 
Church universal, the parish, the sodality, the college, the order, the institute, the convent, 
the monastery – and yes, even La Grande Chartreuse.6   
 
 None of the aforementioned ecclesial societies exists in splendid isolation, of 
course.  They exist in a complex web of dynamically overlapping and interlocking flesh-
and-blood Venn diagrams of other ecclesial societies, and these in turn interface with and 
overlap the garden variety facets of non-ecclesial communal human life such as cities, 
counties, villages, families, clubs, unions, and so forth.  The varied rubbings-up-against 
and crossings-over among all these associational forces are beyond numbering.  Not 
always frictionless, they are among the reasons that leaders and aspiring leaders seek to 
make their mark by tidying things up.  So-called sovereigns and bureaucrats alike delight 
to get lines of jurisdiction laid down and delimited.  And from the project of clarifying it 
is an easy and almost natural next step -- if it has not already been taken -- to start to 
usurp. 
  
 The expulsion of the community of La Grande Chartreuse may be especially 
clarifying, after the manner of a gallows, exactly because of the ways in which it was 
perhaps, if you will, something approaching the pure case.  Ejecting Jesuits is one thing; 
they’re always meddling, rousing the rabble, and generally causing trouble, and not just 
                                                 
6
   Religion is not the only instance of the value of group action. See John Garvey What Are Freedoms For? 
123-54 (1996). 
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for Jansenists.7  In the case of the Carthusians of La Grande Chartreuse, however, these 
were recluses dwelling in the obscurity of the most remote valley Saint Bruno and his 
companions could find when in 1084 they went in search of solitude.  Their life hardly 
implicated Mill’s harm principle.  Moreover, and more serious, ongoing association, in its 
many manifestations, was essential, and conspicuously so, to what they were about.  
Communal prayer, the celebration together of the sacraments, not to mention the joint 
resolve to bear one another along in the monastic pilgrimage – in a word, the act of 
associating (as Carthusian monks): this was not achievable in diaspora.  Which is exactly 
what the French government hoped.   
 
 But what could possibly justify government’s not allowing men8 to dwell together 
in tranquil unity?  One possible justification would be that the individuals concerned did 
not have a right to practice their religion, that is, that none of them individually enjoyed a 
legal right – because none of them enjoyed a natural individual subjective right -- to 
practice the Catholic religion.  Such a putative justification would be false by most 
modern lights, including my own, but, it was not, in any event, the one which the French 
government had in the collective mind when it dislodged the Carthusian community from 
its cloister garth.  The rationale that lay behind the particular statute in question, as well 
as behind hosts of others, was articulated as follows by France’s own Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau:  “It is of necessity . . . that no partial society exist in a state.”9   
 
                                                 
7
   On the relationship among Jesuits, Jansenists, and the French government leading up to the Revolution, 
see Michael Burleigh, Earthly Powers: The Clash of Religion and Politics in Europe from the French 
Revolution to the Great War 28-47 (2005).  See also Dale Van Kley, Jansenists and the Expulsion of the 
Jesuits from France 1757-1765 (1975).   
8
   I should note that there also exist monasteries of Carthusian nuns. 
9
   Jean-Jacques Rousseu Social Contract, II, iii 
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 In holding this view, Rousseau was not eccentric.  The ideal and insistent 
aspiration of the lion’s share of modern political theory and its implementers has been to 
liberate the individual/citizen, whether he like it or not, from his plural and particularist 
associations in order to deliver him barnacle-free to that level playing-field where he and 
his negative liberty would be supervised solely by the solitary sovereign.  In aid and 
justification of this project, it has been characteristic of modern states to claim a 
monopoly over the rights of societies to exist.  Societies spring up quite naturally, of 
course, but the modern state frequently imagines that any right (to continue) to associate 
is the result of a concession by the state.10  If, in this new world order, individuals/citizens 
are allowed by right to associate in partial societies, it would be because the sovereign 
has deigned to concede such a (revocable) right.11  The Third Republic declined to 
concede that right to the monks of La Grande Chartreuse. 
 
II.  Jacques Maritain and  Social Ontology 
 
 Even today, if in more subtle ways – as subtle as the Catholic Charities12 case, as 
to which more in due course – many legitimate governments continue to usurp the liberty 
of the Church.  Not everyone, however, has capitulated to the theories that would justify 
such usurpations.  Throughout the middle third of the twentieth century, the layman 
Jacques Maritain worked out and advanced a robust yet nuanced understanding and 
defense of the liberty of the Church.  I was asked to address the significance Jacques 
                                                 
10
   The expression “concession” was popularized by Otto Gierke.  See, e.g.,  Natural Law and the Theory 
of Society 1500-1800 166 (1950).   
11
   See Russell Hittinger, “Society, Subsidiarity, and Authority in Catholic Social Thought,” in Brennan 
Civilizing Authority 124-25 (2007) 
12
   Catholic Charities v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 4th 527 (2004) 
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Maritain’s thought for the question of libertas Ecclesiae, and I am happy to do so because 
I believe that it is worthwhile to understand and learn from Maritain on this topic as on 
every other one on which he wrote or spoke.13  Maritain lived through the expulsion not 
just of the Carthusians but of many religious orders from his native France; he also lived 
through the closing of thousands of Catholic schools as a consequence of the 1901 Law 
of Associations.14  These usurpations of the liberty of the Church, moreover, were just 
one facet of the totalitarianisms with which he became involuntarily familiar before 
fleeing France, in 1941, for the comparative safety of the United States.  Maritain thought 
hard about the sort of self-aggrandizing, usurping statecraft that predictably, and proudly, 
mutates into totalitarianism.   
 
 It is altogether too easy to forget what Maritain, if we would listen, reminds us of.  
People today, except when they accede to the temptation to imagine full-swing 
“globalization” and correlative “world government,” tend to take the modern nation state, 
with its pretensions to “sovereignty,” for granted, indeed a cause for celebration.  And, 
starting from a hypertrophied concept of the state, people run aground and amok when 
they turn their attention -- if they do turn their attention -- to the Church and her liberty.  
Maritain, by contrast, takes neither concept – church or state -- too easily.  Maritain’s 
precision about what it means to be Church and what it means to be a “state” both 
clarifies the debate and, by doing so, raises the stakes of judgment.  Too liberal for 
                                                 
13
   For a compendious introduction to Maritain’s socio-political thought, see Patrick  McKinley Brennan, 
“Jacques Maritain,” in John Witte Jr. and Frank Alexander, The Teachings of Modern Catholicism on Law, 
Politics, and Human Nature 106 (2007). 
14
 “Originally, there were about 20,000 Catholic schools in France and by September 1904 [Prime Minister] 
Combes was able to boast that he had closed almost 14,000.”  Holmes, Triumph of the Holy See, 245.  On 
Combes’s zealous enforcement of the Law of Associations, see John McManners, Church and State in 
France, 1870-1914 129-39 (1972).  See also M. O Partin, Waldeck-Rousseau, Combes, and the Church: 
The Politics of Anti-Clericalism (1969). 
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conservatives and too conservative for liberals, Maritain offers all-comers ample food for 
thought.  Maritain’s work merits study for its intrinsic value, especially, in this context, 
his clarity about what is usually discussed under the confused and generally confusing 
label “subsidiarity.”   
 
 To this we can can add that Maritain’s understanding of the differentiation of 
Church and state is, approximately, the one on which the Church settled at the Second 
Vatican Council. This was long in the making.  Eugenio Pacelli, the future Pope Pius XII 
(r. 1939-1958), read Maritain and, as is well known, Giovanni Montini, the future Pope 
Paul VI (r. 1963-1978), not only read Maritain but translated his work and even 
considered him his mentor and, quite remarkably, cited him by name in an encyclical.  
Without prejudice to the role of Fr. John Courtney Murray, S.J., in the Church’s 
recognizing and declaring the right to religious liberty, we can observe that it is 
something close to the layman Maritain’s social ontology that one discerns in modern 
magisterial teachings on Church and state.  In the words of the Second Vatican Council’s 
Declaration on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis humanae:  
 
The freedom of the Church (libertas ecclesiae) is the fundamental 
principle in what concerns the relations between the Chuch and 
governments and the whole civil order (totumque ordinem civilem). . . .  
The Church . . . claims for herself in her character as a society of men who 
have the right (qui iure gaudent) to live in society in accordance with the 
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principles of the Christian faith. . . .  This independence is precisely what 
the authorities of the Church claim in society.15    
 
 The principal point I should like to develop here is this: Maritain’s -- and the 
Church’s -- account is emphaticially one of a social ontology, that is, an ontology of 
social forms.  On Maritain’s -- and the Magisterium’s -- view, the starting point for a 
solution to any perceived “problem” of Church and state and, above all, for an accurate 
statement of the liberty of the Church, is to recover an ontology of plural social forms 
that are, at least in potency, given, either by nature (e.g., the family) or supernature (the 
Church).  The central thesis is that what is to be family or Church or body politic does not 
await invention, although it may await instantiation or re-instantiation, formation or re-
formation.  In a world that respects such forms, one is not pinioned among a putatively 
sovereign state and lone individuals and, perhaps, a Church (some of) whose liberty is 
parceled out by the sovereign.  One is instead faced with a plurality of societies, as well 
as individuals, in need of respect and coordination, perhaps regulation, and sometimes 
help – but never brute demolition of a thriving society, never what happened at La 
Grande Chartreuse.   
 
  
III.  The Decision to Differentiate 
 
                                                 
15
   Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Declaration on Religious Libery, Dignitatis humanae (1965), no. 
13. 
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 I have been referring to “the liberty of the Church,” but it is needful to recall that 
what we mean by “the Church” is neither univocal nor immediately clear.  There are 
competing and sometimes complementary “models” of the Church. 16  Some of these 
models, moreover, emerged and have been refined in the very theological and 
philosophical work by which the Church differentiated herself from the political realities 
with which she was historically associated and in which she was sometimes thought to be 
embedded.  For the better part of Christian history, “the Catholic Church was wedded to 
Western society in the form of a single, though differentiated, corpus mysticum.”17  What 
we refer to as the problem of “Church and state,” what was sometimes referred to as the 
relationship between “throne and altar,” was long celebrated (and sometimes vilified) as 
“Christendom,” a mystical organic unity of the forms of ruling authority in which God 
allows humans to participate.  Though indeed “differentiated” in various permutations, 
there was a reliable emphasis on their unity in one organic whole.     
 
 In short, the Church came into the modern period interlaced and interlocked in all 
manner of ways, both factually and conceptually, with institutions from which, in the 
course of the nineteenth century, she would decide that she must decisively differentiate 
herself.  The result of this differentiation would be the end of “Christendom.”  Exactly 
how that differentiation was to take shape, is my principal concern in this paper.  Before 
turning to the particulars of the differentiation, however, it merits emphasis that it was the 
Church’s will that differentiation occur, and this, not for the advantage of the state or of 
                                                 
16
   See Avery Cardinal Dulles, Models of the Church (New York: Doubleday, 2002). 
17
   Russell Hittinger, Dignitatis Humanae, “Religious Liberty, and Ecclesiastical Self-Government,”  68 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1035, 1040 (1999).  See generally Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study 
in Mediaeval Political Theology  (1957). 
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indifferentism, but above all, of course, for the Church’s own freedom and work:  These 
salient facts that are lost on many of our own pro-establishment contemporaries were not 
always lost on our ancestors who favored the puppet national Catholic churches that a 
decadent Christendom could reliably deliver.  In France in 1868, for example, Emile 
Ollivier declared in the Chamber of Deputies:  “Undoubtedly, Gentlemen, I know that 
Rome earnestly wishes to separate itself from the State, but,” Ollivier continued 
presciently, “she does not want the State to separate itself from Her.”18    
 
 It is common to associate the differentiation with the revolution in France, and it 
is indeed true that from at least the time of Revolution “issues of ecclesiology were 
deeply interwoven in the mélange of the disputes between the Church and the” new-
fangled “states” that were vying for recognition.  I say “at least,” however, because, as 
Maritain observed in his 1927 book The Things That Are Not Caesar’s, “it was five 
hundred years ago that we began to die.”19  And, it was some five-hundred years before 
that that “we,” the Church, were at the peak of health, at least at a conceptual level.  We 
can take this in stages.   
 
   The monk Hildebrand was elected to the Chair of Peter in 1073, from which he 
reigned as Pope Gregory VII until 1085, effecting what is known as the Gregorian 
“reformatio.”  Wishing to purify the Church and insulate her governance from lay 
interference, in 1075 Gregory published Dictatus Papae, consisting of twenty-seven crisp 
                                                 
18
   Quoted in Russell Hittinger, “Introduction to Modern Roman Catholicism,” in John Witte, Jr., and 
Frank Alexander (eds.), The Teachings of Modern Roman Catholicism on Law, Politics, and Human 
Nature 11 (2007). 
19
   Hittinger, Introduction, 6. 
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propositions addressed to himself.  One proposition claimed that “he alone [the pope] 
may depose and reinstate bishops,” and another that “no judgment of his may be revised 
by anyone, . . . he alone may revise [the judgments] of all.”20  “This document,” Harold 
Berman explains, “was revolutionary – although Gregory ultimately managed to find 
some legal authority for every one of its provisions.”21   
 
 Not everyone agreed with the Pope, but the model was more than amply clear.  
Gregory excommunicated Emperor Henry IV on account of his disagreement.22  (Henry, 
it will be recalled, repented, standing barefoot in the snow for three days outside of the 
castle of Countess Matilda of Tuscany).  Thanks to the Gregorian reform, the Church 
succeeded in a rather significant way in creating what has been called “a church within a 
church,” such that she – in the form of religious houses (on the model of Cluny and Bec) 
and religious orders (such as the Benedictines, the Camaldolese, the Cistercians, and yes, 
the Carthusians) – was exempt not only from lay control but also from that of local 
bishops.  This internal differentiation of the Church was a mighty innovation, the 
significance of which is easily lost on those of us moderns who willy-nilly fall back into 
the mode of thinking that the Church is made and constituted sort of the way a bus-stop 
gets populated, that is, by individuals’ showing up and continuing to hang around, or not.  
                                                 
20
   Quoted in Brian Tierney, Crisis of Church and State, 49-50.  See also Harold Berman, Law and 
Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, 95-96 (1983).  Berman’s claims for the 
revolutionary qualities of Gregory’s reform are question by Tierney (among others). See Tierney, Crisis of 
Church and State, 46-47.  For a brief statement of pre-Gregorian reflection on the duality of ruling powers, 
see Avery Cardinal Dulles, “The Indirect Mission of the Church to Politics,” 52 Villanova L.Rev. 241, 241-
42 (2007). 
21
   Berman, Law and Revolution, 96 
22
  In this connection, it will not to amiss to quote an aside by Jacques Maritain:  “It makes a Frenchman 
blush to think that Gallican governments long compelled the episcopate to suppress the lessons in the 
breviary relating to St. Gregory VII, because that Pope deposed Emperor Henry IV.”  Jacques Maritain, 
The Things That Are Not Caesar’s 17-18 (1931). 
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Beginning from the premise that membership in the particular society that is the Church 
universal is, if you will, an ontological fact (traceable to baptism, the event of 
incorporation), the Gregorian reform then went on to clarify, and protect, the other unities 
of association by which the ecclesial reality was internally differentiated.  There will be 
more to say about this.    
 
  Meanwhile, however, the rest of the Church remained, more or less, in the debt of 
those laity whose generosity to the Church had been rewarded with the ius patronatus, a 
varied bundle of rights that, thanks to the Church’s delegation, could be exercised to 
influence the governance of the Church, as by vetoing potential bishops.  (By the way, 
the Polish state vetoed seven candidates before allowing the future John Paul II to 
become bishop of Krakow.  Too clever by half, I’d say).23  Such rights date back as far as 
the sixth century, but approaching the eleventh century, and then again approaching the 
sixteenth century, when “we began to die,” those possessed of the ius patronatus were 
tending to view their ius as their own jurisdiction, that is, as not a concession by the 
Church.  Referring to what happened in Spain in the late fifteenth century, where this 
development was perhaps most notable, Russell Hittinger explains:  “The key point . . . is 
that Madrid did not regard the authority as delegated, but rather interpreted Roman 
concessions as recognition of authority inherent in state sovereignty.”24  He continues:  
“The architects of the French Revolution did not invent, but rather inherited, the principle 
that the church, as a visible and temporal society, was the property of the state.”25 
 
                                                 
23
   Hittinger,  Dignitatis, 1042. 
24
   Hittinger, Introduction, 7 
25
   Hittinger, Introduction, 7 
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 As we have observed, the Church came into the nineteenth century with 
Christendom as the model of choice.  In its purity, the idea was that Church and state 
were one body, “internally differentiated by two authorities, each of which was thought to 
share in Christ’s triplex munus of priest, prophet, and king.  The King participated in 
Christ’s rule pedes in terra (feet on earth) while the episcopal authority imaged Christ’s 
rule caput in caelo (head in heaven).”26  There were many variations on exactly how all 
this was to be understood, as the research of Ernst Kantorowicz has shown in deep detail, 
but the core idea remained intact.  There was one body, with two authorities, and one 
authority, the spiritual, was superior.  “There was one a time when States were governed 
by the philosophy of the Gospel,”27 wrote Pope Leo in 1885 as he looked back at a world 
gone-by. 
 
 As the modern nations states grew, most of them remained de jure within the 
Catholic fold, but, de facto, they grew independent wings and arrant aspirations to 
sovereignty; creepingly but insistently, the national Catholic churches were subordinated 
to their respective national sovereigns.  For example, when the Tsar of Russia in 1812 
won the right to govern the former Kingdom of Poland, Pope Gregory XVI – no 
modernist, he – responded by reminding the Polish bishops (in the encyclical Cum 
primum) of their duty to obey the temporal authority.  Here we have the Pope telling the 
Church in Poland to “abandon its self-government to a schismatic tsar.”28   
 
                                                 
26
   Hittinger, Dignitatis humanae, 1040 
27
   Encyclical Immortale Dei no. 21; discussed at Hittinger, Dignitatis humanae, 1040. 
28
   Hittinger, Introduction, 9 
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 Throughout the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, as the Popes 
scrambled to save face and make the best of many a bad situation, the dysfunction and 
possible ways forward became the subject of serious study.  Shortly before his death in 
1878, Pope Pius IX expressed privately that his ways, including his stalwart insistence 
that the Christendom model -- complete with Papal States, to boot -- was the only correct 
model, had failed and that it was time for a new approach.29  In the course of the twenty-
five year pontificate of his successor, Pope Leo XIII, there emerged the clear-sighted 
judgment that “the state cannot co-govern the church.”30  The Church was to be what the 
Gregorian reform of the eleventh century had sought:  free to be herself.  And she was to 
be free in virtue of a clear differentiation of Church and state; according to Leo, “there 
are on earth two principal societies, the one civil, the proximate end of which is the 
temporal and worldly good of the human race; the other religious, whose office it is to 
lead mankind to that true, heavenly, and everlasting happiness for which we are 
created.”31  But, though many who would come later would overlook or deny the point, 
Leo believed that the Church must now reach people through its direct effect on 
individuals and society (rather than, as before, through the arm of the state).  From now 
on the Church’s temporal mission would focus on “faith embodied in the conscience of 
peoples rather than restoration of medieval institutions.”32 
  
IV. Three Elements, Not Two 
 
                                                 
29
   Derek Holmes, The Triumph of the Holy See 160 (1978) 
30
   Hittinger, Introduction, 9 
31
   Encyclical Nobilisima Gallorum gens, no. 4 (1884). 
32
   Hittinger, Introduction, 11 
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 Leo’s first encyclical was on “the evils of society” and his second, published 
within the same year, specialized in the same by condemning “socialism.”  Aeterni 
Patris, his third encyclical -- the programmatic one of his pontificate -- was published the 
next year (1879).  As is well known, Aeterni Patris summoned the faithful to look to the 
works of the great scholastics and, above all, of  St. Thomas Aquinas for resources both 
intellectual and spiritual with which to forge remedies for the evils afflicting both 
“domestic and civil society.”33  
 
 Re-enter Jacques Maritain, a man who believed that it was his personal vocation 
to respond to the summons of Aeterni patris, that is, to philosophize as a Thomist.  He 
also, like Leo, believed that there was creative work to be done.  “Thomas, after all, had 
no conception of a modern state or an industrialized economy.  Nor in Thomas could 
there be found a ready-made doctrine of subsidiarity, justiciable natural rights, social 
justice, political parties, or a lay-based democracy.”34  These were to be achievements of 
neo-Thomists, and in an exemplary way, of Jacques Maritain. 
 
 When Leo’s twenty-five year pontificate ended in 1903, the Magisterium’s 
development of political theology abated until the election of Achille Ratti as Pius XI in 
1922.  Ratti had been educated by Leo’s Thomistic colleagues in Rome, and as Pius XI 
he immediately set about furthering the Leonine Thomistic project.  It was during Ratti’s 
formidable pontificate that Maritain first, and irrevocably, turned his attention to 
statecraft and politics, recognizing that “whereas for centuries the crucial issues for 
                                                 
33
   No. 28 
34
   Hittinger, Introduction, 13. 
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religious thought were the great theological controversies centered on the dogmas of 
faith, the crucial issues will now deal with political theology and political philosophy.”35   
Maritain’s first foray into this area was in 1927; in English it bears the title The Things 
That Are Not Caesar’s, while in French it was known as The Primacy of the Spiritual.  
Together the two titles signal two points on which Maritain never fails to insist.  First, 
there is a jurisdiction other than Caesar’s; second, that other jurisdiction is higher.  
However, the fact that the Church exercises a higher jurisdiction does not lead Maritain 
to conflate Church and state or to collapse the state into the Church.  It leads him, instead, 
to distinguish carefully and thus to differentiate adequately.  Adequate differentiation is 
exactly what had not happened in the past to the extent, and that extent was large, that it 
was thought and believed that the Church was married to society in the aforementioned 
corpus mysticum.   
 
 Before following Maritain, we need to be clear on what exactly Maritain will be 
arguing against.  When the moderns confronted this mystical organic unity, they wrung 
from it only individuals and a sovereign that, across a territorially bounded unit, 
exercised over themselves something called “sovereignty.”  Less obvious than the 
dissolution of the organic unity of the overall corpus mysticum is the correlative modern 
judgment that the only unity individuals can achieve is to be achieved extrinsically, that 
is, “by contracts, by the serendipitous outcomes of a market, or, more ominously, by the 
external application of law as the superior force of the state.”36  The characteristic 
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modern move is to deny the possibility of intrinsic unity (other than of individual 
substances).    
 
 The modern model allows exactly two fundamental elements: individuals and 
their sovereign, the latter of which frequently is referred to as “the state.”  Not only are 
there no supernaturally given intrinsic social unities, such as the Church, there are not 
even any naturally given intrinsic social unities, such as the family.  If you think this is 
fanciful, consider this bald assertion by Yale Law professor Robert Post:  “There is no 
‘natural’ social order . . . ”37 – and, though Post of course does not trouble himself to 
deny it, no “supernatural” social order either.  With no intrinsic social unities given, it is 
an easy next step to suppose that unities need not be allowed.  On the modern view, if 
individuals enjoy a right to associate, they do so simply thanks to the sovereign state’s 
concession of a right to exist, a right extrinsically to associate. 
 
 Re-enter Maritain again.  Differentiating the corpus mysticum, Maritain finds 
individuals, alright, but individuals who are, by nature, social – individuals, that is, each 
of whom is a unity and individuals who are, either in fact or in potency, participants in 
the intrinsic unities of marriage, family, church, and the body politic.  Against the view 
that any unity is extrinsic, Maritain counters that there are intrinsic unities, that there is 
“an ontological landscape to social forms.”38  Though they certainly require our free and 
constructive contribution (they are not the product of autogenesis such that human 
freedom is pro tanto canceled), these come from nature, our nature; they are, as Maritain 
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says in a phrase I find memorable, “rough-hewn by nature.”39  The exception to what I 
just wrote is “the Church;” though the realizing of her essence also requires the 
contribution of human agency, her form comes not from nature, but from God. All of 
these given intrinsic unities, both natural and supernatural, deserve to be treated as what 
they are, not as mere extrinsic aggregations.   
 
 So far, then, there are two fundamental elements to reckon with: individuals and 
societies.  There is, though, a third element, and we can discover it by following Maritain 
in a distinction to which I have not yet called attention, though it has appeared in the 
course of the argument.  The distinction is between that specific social form that we call 
political society or (as Maritain prefers) the body politic, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the “state.”  In general usage, the term “state” is almost hopelessly ambiguous.  
Sometimes, as noted above, “state” refers to the “sovereign,” where the latter is 
understood as the government/governor that is above and separate from the governed; at 
other times it refers to the government/governor who is above but not separate from the 
governed; at still other times it refers not only to the government/governor but also and at 
the same time to those who are governed.  Maritain proposes to limit the term “state” to 
refer to 
 
that part of the body politic especially concerned with the maintenance of 
law, the promotion of the common welfare and public order, and the 
administration of public affairs.  The State is a part which specializes in 
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the interests of the whole.  It is not a man or a body of men; it is a set of 
institutions combined into a topmost machine . . . .40  
 
Maritain, then, limits state to the second of the three usages noted above: the “state” is 
above but not separate from political society.  The difference is not (as they say) “merely 
semantic.”  It names the third basic element.   
 
 Starting from the basic reality of political society, rather than of a merely 
extrinsically aggregated group of individuals known as, say, “the people,” Maritain 
observes that those so-constituted govern themselves, and do so through the “state.”  The 
body politic is not (if you will) acephalous; it has a head, and it is its own head.  On 
Maritain’s account, the state is not separate from and above political society.  The state is, 
in effect, that part of themselves that is their servant or instrument.  Not some tyrant 
above the people (and free to pursue its own interests), but the people’s own creation, it is 
duty bound, in virtue of the purpose of its creation, to serve them and the good that is 
common to them.   
 
 And, since the usual meaning of “sovereign” is to be absolute (which just means, 
in its Latin etymology, to be unbound, ab-solutus), the state cannot helpfully be described 
as sovereign.  It was for this reason (among others) that Maritain counseled us altogether 
to abandon the word sovereignty.  What the state possesses or embodies is authority – the 
legitimate but limited power to rule. 
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V.  Pluralism and “Subsidiarity” 
 
 
 With this we come to the heart of the matter.  The authority that is embodied in 
the “state” is just one – though a unique one – among many authorities.  Every genuine 
society possesses authority.  A society without authority is a society on the way out.  
Authority is that (topmost) part of a particular society that has the responsibility for the 
increase and maintenance of the good of the respective society.  To recognize a plurality 
of given social forms and the societies that actually instantiate them is, then, 
correlatively, to recognize a plurality of authorities: the authority of the father or mother 
over the family, the abbot over the abbey, the bishop over the diocese, the Pope over the 
Church, and, yes, the Prior of La Grande Chartreuse over the monks and affairs of La 
Grande Chartreuse.  Furthermore, each of these -- from the remote mountains of the south 
of France to the top of Vatican Hill – represents a limitation on would-be sovereigns 
everywhere, a limitation on the authority of the state as well as on the respective 
authorities of all other societies.  The Church, for example, must respect the authority of 
family; family must respect the authority of the Church.  According to Maritain: 
 
As opposed to the various totalitarian conceptions of political society in 
vogue today, the conception here is of a pluralist body politic bringing 
together in its organic unity a diversity of social groupings and structures, 
each of them embodying positive liberties. . . .  Civil society is made up 
not only of individuals, but of particular societies formed by them, and a 
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pluralist body politic would allow to these societies the greatest autonomy 
possible and would diversify its own internal structure in keeping with 
what is typically required by their nature.41 
 
The “pluralist principle” is Maritain’s synonym for what, in the tradition of modern 
Catholic social doctrine, usually gets referred to as the principle of subsidiarity.   
 
 I am not aware that Maritain ever used the term subsidiarity, and this is, I would 
suggest, all to the good.  His alternative terminology helps clarify what “subsidiarity,” as 
properly understood in the tradition of Catholic social doctrine, is -- and is not -- about.  
In common parlance, including about the Maastrict Treaty, one hears that subsidiarity is 
the principle that ruling power should devolve to the lowest level at which it can be 
exercised effectively.42  In Catholic social doctrine, however, subsidiarity means what 
Maritain refers to as the pluralist principle: Plural societies and their respective 
authorities must be respected. 
 
 In a world in which no natural or supernatural intrinsic unities are given, even in 
potency, and in which it is assumed that a sovereign possesses plenary power to parcel 
out, it may make a certain sort of sense to resist or limit the sovereign by advancing a 
principle according to which he “ought” to allow his power to devolve.  Frequently, 
including in advertising for the conference for which this paper was prepared, so-called 
mediating institutions are justified on the somewhat different ground that they usefully 
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check government’s power.  Perhaps they do.  But in a world in which plural social forms 
are given, at least in potency, the putative sovereign’s authority is already and always 
limited, and ontologically so.  In such a world, subsidiarity means two things.  First, it is 
a principle of non-absorption; given social forms are to be respected.  Second, and 
correlative, it is a principle that, when help or assistance flows among such societies, it be 
aimed at supporting, not absorbing.43  “As opposed to the various totalitarian conceptions 
of political society in vogue today,” Maritain writes, “the conception here is of a pluralist 
body politic bringing together in its organic unity a diversity of social groupings and 
structures, each of them embodying positive liberties.”44  
 
  
VI.  Church, State, and the Body Politic 
 
 All of this, then, is the background, the ontological landscape within which 
Maritain comes to the particular problematic we commonly call “Church and state.”  
From his understanding of this landscape, Maritain draws three “general immutable 
principles” that are to govern that problematic.  By attending to these, and also to 
Martain’s applications of the same, we can take the measure of what our world might 
look like if it were to be differentiated as Maritain envisioned.  It is important to 
underline that, as Maritain sees the matter, these are not pie-in-the-sky aspirations for 
another time and place.  Maritain knew the state of the liberty of the Church in our 
country; Maritain knew the Everson and McCollum decisions enough to complain about 
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them.45  Maritain was not daunted; he did not take refuge behind a “thesis” that could not 
be achieved.  He sought, and exhorted others who would come later, to seek concrete 
historical “ideals which are neither absolute nor bound to an unrealizable past, but which 
are relative – relative to a given time – and which moreover can be claimed and asserted 
as realizable,” 46 and they include the concrete conditions of the true libertas Ecclesiae.  
 
 Before getting to Maritain’s three principles, a clarification of context will be in 
order.  While my emphasis has been on the ontology of social -- rather than substantial -- 
forms, the complete landscape sketched by Maritain includes not only the social but also 
the personal ontology, that is, the ontology of human persons each with his or her own 
unique, and irreducible< everlasting destiny:  “the human person is both part of the body 
politic and superior to it through what is supra-temporal, or eternal, in him, in his spiritual 
interests and his final destination.”47  The end of the body politic, the temporal common 
good, is limited by and subordinated to, inter alia, every single human person’s 
ordination, here and now, to a higher end, that is, to God.  It is on this basis -- the 
individual person’s duty to seek God and worship Him as he finds Him -- that Maritain 
bases the individual right to religious freedom. 
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 For all his celebration of the metaphysical density and calling of every individual 
human person, however, Maritain never loses sight of the intrinsic connection between 
individual persons and the societies on which their identities and fulfillments depend, 
and, above all, that society that is the Church.  The state is limited by individuals’ 
respective natural and supernatural ends; the state is also limited by the Church and her 
ends.  For the Church to be herself, she must be free, and Maritain is concerned to justify 
the liberty of the Church in the eyes both of believers and of non-believers.   
 
 What is the Church that she should be free?  In the eyes of the unbeliever (who is 
not yet “an unbeliever in reason,” Maritain adds), “the Church, or the Churches, are in the 
social community particular bodies which must enjoy that right to freedom which is but 
one, not only with the right to free association naturally belonging to the human person, 
but the right freely to believe the truth recognized by one’s conscience, that is, with the 
most basic and inalienable of all human rights.”48  And what is the Church for the 
believer?  “[T]he Church is a supernatural society, both divine and human – the very type 
of perfect or achieved-in-itself, self-sufficient, and independent society – which unites in 
itself men as co-citizens of the Kingdom of God and leads them to eternal life, already 
begun here below.”49  He continues in language that leaves no room for cultured 
misinterpretation: 
 
In such a perspective, not only is the freedom of the Church to be 
recognized as required by freedom of association and freedom of religious 
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belief without interference from the State, but that freedom of the Church 
appears as grounded on the very rights of God and as identical with His 
own freedom in the very face of any human institution.  The freedom of 
the Church does express the very independence of the Incarnate Word.50     
 
The first immutable principle, then, is that the Church must be free to “teach and preach 
and worship, the freedom of the Gospel, the freedom of the word of God.”51     
 
 The second immutable principle is nothing short of “the superiority of the Church 
– that is, of the spiritual – over the body politic or the State.”52  Although the Church is in 
a way “in” every body politic, both through the presence there of her members and also 
though her institutions, in her “essence” she is “not a part but a whole; she is an 
absolutely universal realm stretching all over the world – above the body politic and 
every body politic.”53   
 
 The third immutable principle follows from the fact that “the same human person 
is simultaneously a member of that society which is the Church and a member of that 
society which is the body politic.  An absolute division between the two of those two 
societies would mean that the human person must be cut in two.”  Therefore, 
“cooperation between the Church and the body politic or the State” is “necessary.”54  In 
view of the pluralist principle (or the principle of subsidiarity, properly understood), we 
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know in advance that help flowing between Church and state, in either or both directions, 
must aim at support, not absorption. 
 
 Maritain explains (quoting John Courtney Murray) that such cooperation will 
entail, first, that the state fulfill its own duties, by implementing the natural law and 
securing a workable juridical order.55  It will entail, second, the “public acknowledgment 
of the existence of God:”  “a political society really and vitally Christian would be 
conscious of the doctrine and morality which enlighten for it – that is, for the majority of 
the people – the tenets of the democratic charter, and which guide it in putting those 
tenets into force.”  And finally, Maritain specifies two forms of mutual assistance 
between Church and state. 
 
 The first and “most basic of them is the recognition and guarantee by the State of 
the full freedom of the Church.”  Maritain continues, countering the “illusion of modern 
times [according to which] mutual freedom means mutual ignorance:”  “[T]he fact of 
insuring the freedom of somebody is surely an actual, and most actual, though negative, 
form of cooperation with him and assistance to him.”56  The second form of mutual 
assistance is a positive one, and, according to Maritain, derives first from the body politic 
and only derivatively from the state (as the body’s politic’s instrument):   
 
It is . . . by asking the assistance of the Church for its own temporal 
common good that the body politic would assist her [the Church] in her 
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spiritual mission.  For the concept of help is not a one-way concept; help 
is a two-way traffic.  And after all, is it not more normal to have what is 
superior, or of greater worth in itself, aiding what is of lesser dignity, than 
to have what is terrestrial aiding what is spiritual.”57   
 
What Maritain has in mind is the body politic’s asking and positively facilitating, “within 
the framework of laws,” “the religious, social, and educational work by means of which 
she – as well as the other spiritual or cultural groups whose helpfulness for the common 
good would be recognized by them – freely cooperates in the common welfare.”58  
Although in his early work Maritain countenanced the possibility of a privileged juridical 
status for the Catholic Church, on his mature view establishment and privilege are ruled 
out on account of the conditions for achieving the temporal common good. 
 
Once the political society had been fully differentiated in its secular type, 
the fact of inserting into the body politic a particular or partial common 
good, the temporal common good of the faithful of one religion (even 
though it were the true religion), and of claiming for them, accordingly, a 
privileged juridical position in the body politic, would be inserting into the 
latter a divisive principle and, to that extent, interfering with the temporal 
common good.59 
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The resulting situation is one which the Church claims for herself the freedom to be 
herself, and, although superior to all other societies, is unwilling and disallowed to make 
“institutional, communal claims on the body politic.”60  At liberty to be herself, the 
Church is to exercise an indirect, vivifying influence on society (and its institutions). 
 
 
VII.  Conclusion: Society and the Conditions of Its Realization 
 
 When the Church reached the judgment that the time had come to differentiate 
herself more adequately from the state and the body politic, it was not without awareness 
of the risks.  The transcendent risk was that she would be reduced, in the eyes of those 
with power, to the status of associations that governments would consider themselves 
free to allow or not to allow, and, in any event, to regulate for their own purposes.61  
There was the risk that the Church would be seen and treated as merely an aggregation of 
individuals privately and extrinsically associated, rather than, in virtue of its public 
founding by Christ, a truly public society worthy of respect and, perhaps, assistance.62  If, 
as Margaret Thatcher asserted, “there is no such thing as society,”63 the Church is in 
trouble – as are we all. 
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 Dame Thatcher did not have the last word.  We have recently witnessed a 
renewed, though by no means universal, attention to society as a phenomenon of political 
significance and moment, not an illusion to be dispelled.64  Especially illuminating, for 
present purposes, is the discussion of it by Robert Post and Nancy Rosenblum in their 
2002 book Civil Society and Government.  “Civil society,” they observe, “is not a residue 
on the way to a unified state in which citizenship eclipses other aspects of belonging . . .   
Pluralism has a normative as well as a descriptive dimension.”65  So far, so good.  
However, there is predictably, and in a way understandably, no recognition that some of 
the many particular instantiations of civil society, specifically those of the Church, are 
not malleable in the way that others might be.  The Boy Scouts can arrange themselves 
almost any way they desire.  By her own confession, though, the Catholic Church cannot; 
for example, it would be ultra vires of the Pope to try to eliminate the distinction between 
the laity and the clergy or between priest and bishop66 – no matter the egalitarian 
clamorings of civil society, societies aplenty, and legion individuals locked in an 
overlapping consensus.   
 
 The result of not heeding the dispositive character of given social forms is that the 
way is left open, or at least partially open, to government’s creating a “congruence” 
between specific moral values of the government and those of particular instantiations or 
phases of civil society.  As Post and Rosenblum observe, “[t]he ‘logic of congruence’ 
envisions civil society as reflecting common values and practices ‘all the way down.”67  
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Post and Rosenblum presciently mentioned Catholic Charities by name, some two years 
before the landmark case of that name was decided by the California Supreme Court.  
What was decided there is that, if Catholic Charities of California offers its employees a 
health insurance plan, that plan must include contraceptives, despite the Catholic 
Church’s judgment that doing so would make her a material cooperator in conduct that 
violates the natural and divine moral laws.  The argument from “congruence” carried the 
day.  We would be remiss not to ask how many steps separate such usurpation of the 
Church’s self-determination from the requirement for an authorization of the sort the 
monks of La Grande Chartreuse were denied. 
  
 I suggested at the beginning that the case of the monks of La Grande Chartreuse  
is perhaps something approaching the pure case – remote recluses who could pose little 
threat to anyone’s earthly projects.  But that is perhaps to miss the deeper point.  The 
monks, though not involved in any active ministry themselves, funded many institutional 
works of mercy in the surrounding region, and the beneficiaries and others knew as 
much.  What is more, the Carthusians’ ancient presence there within the walls of their 
cloister -- their venerable witness to the sufficiency of God -- was widely known, 
celebrated, and hallowed.  For those set against the Church, there would be a special 
vexation at the thought or sight of men dedicated to, if you will, nothing more than the 
divine service.  The revolutionaries and their successors had a particular hatred of the 
contemplative orders.  The corporal works of mercy and deeds of justice could be 
converted, to some extent, to the purposes of egalitarian reformers.68  Not so the divine 
praises, however; and it was for this reason, in part, that Pope Pius XI made a hallmark of 
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his pontificate the celebration of the pure contemplative life.  Indeed, he took the 
occasion of approving the Carthusians’ required revision of their Statutes (in order to 
conform to the 1917 revision of the Code of Canon Law) to issue what has become the 
modern papal charter of the contemplative life.69   
 
 The Carthusians’ cloistered witness to the Divine Persons is a rebuke to those 
who would create paradise on earth.70  It was, then, not without some risk or cost that, in 
1941, the monks were finally allowed to return to La Grande Chartreuse.  They remain 
today, as they had since the time of the Revolution, tenants of the French state that had 
not been invented when, in 1084, Hugh, bishop of nearby Grenoble, gave St. Bruno and 
his companions a place to call home in the Chartreuse mountain range.  The pluralist 
principle assigns to the state a role in facilitating the existence and interaction of plural 
social forces – not simply to check power, but to respect an ontology that is both from 
nature and from supernature.  But when we say that these forms are from nature and from 
supernature, we do well to recall Bertrand de Jouvenel’s admonition that such 
imputations of formal causality, though true, can distract us from the fact that they 
depend as well as on the efficient causality that is our own human agency.71  The forms 
that come in potency from nature or supernature depend, for their temporal, terrestrial 
realization, on our creation of the necessary or desirable social, juridical conditions.  In 
aid of that, in the world as we know and can foresee it, it would seem that we must write 
and interpret constitutions (and other laws) that assist in the realization and augmentation 
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of such social forms.  It is a further, and not merely speculative, question whether or not 
it is possible for us to write a just (and enforceable) constitution that does not recognize, 
as some say our United States Constitution does not, the liberty of the Church.72  
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